Agent, Broker and Premium Fraud
In the Certified Fraud Examiner (CFE) body of knowledge, insurance fraud is divided into schemes committed by policyholders/claimants and schemes committed by industry insiders such as agents and brokers. Agent, broker, and premium fraud falls into the insider category and exploits the trust and control these intermediaries have over premiums, applications, and policy documents. 1. Premium Theft (Premium Diversion): The most common scheme. An agent or broker collects premiums from customers but never remits them to the insurer, instead pocketing the money. The policyholder believes coverage exists until a claim is denied or a cancellation notice arrives. Red flags include customer complaints of lapsed coverage, premiums paid in cash or to the agent personally, and delays between collection and remittance. 2. Fictitious Policies and Churning: Agents may write fake policies for nonexistent insureds to earn commissions, or 'churn' existing clients by repeatedly replacing policies to generate new first-year commissions, harming the customer through surrender charges and lost benefits. 'Sliding' involves adding unwanted coverage without the customer's knowledge. 3. Application Fraud and Misrepresentation: To secure a sale or lower premium, the agent falsifies information on the application—understating risk, misclassifying a business, concealing medical history, or forging signatures. 'Clean sheeting' describes submitting an application that omits known health problems. 4. Premium Fraud by Insureds (Workers' Compensation): Employers underreport payroll, misclassify employees into lower-risk job codes, treat employees as independent contractors, or create shell companies to hide loss history, thereby paying lower premiums than their true exposure warrants. 5. Fictitious Death or Surrender Claims and Fake Insurers: Dishonest brokers may sell policies from unlicensed or nonexistent carriers, collecting premiums with no intention of providing coverage. CFEs detect these schemes through premium reconciliations, policyholder confirmations, commission trend analysis, payroll audits, and review of customer complaints. Controls include direct billing to the insurer, segregation of duties, surprise audits of agent trust accounts, and licensing verification.
Agent, Broker and Premium Fraud (ACFE CFE Exam Guide – Insurance Fraud)
Insurance fraud is one of the most heavily tested areas within the Financial Transactions and Fraud Schemes section of the CFE Exam, and agent, broker and premium fraud is a core sub-topic. Agents and brokers occupy a position of trust between the insurer and the insured: they collect money, complete applications, explain coverage and often handle claims paperwork. That position creates a classic opportunity leg of the fraud triangle. The Fraud Examiners Manual (FEM) treats these schemes as a distinct category because they are committed by insiders or intermediaries rather than by claimants, and because detection requires looking at commissions, remittances and underwriting records rather than at loss claims alone.
On the exam you are expected to (a) recognise and define specific agent/broker schemes by name, (b) understand how each scheme is executed, (c) identify red flags, and (d) know basic detection and prevention controls. Definitional questions on twisting, churning, sliding, premium theft, fictitious policies and equity funding appear frequently.
2. What Is Agent, Broker and Premium Fraud?
Agent/broker fraud refers to schemes committed by the licensed intermediaries who sell and service insurance policies. The agent either steals money that belongs to the insurer or the policyholder, or manipulates the sales and underwriting process to generate improper commissions and bonuses.
Premium fraud refers to schemes built around the premium itself: diverting premiums that were collected, inventing premiums that were never collected, or (on the insured side) misrepresenting risk information so that the premium charged is lower than it should be. The most commonly cited form of insured-side premium fraud is workers' compensation premium fraud, where an employer underreports payroll, misclassifies employees into lower-risk job codes, or hides its loss history to reduce premiums.
Remember the two directions of harm:
• Victim = insurer – fictitious policies, commission manipulation, premium diversion, employer premium misrepresentation.
• Victim = policyholder – premium theft leaving the customer uninsured, twisting, churning, sliding, fictitious payee schemes.
3. How the Major Schemes Work
a) Premium Theft / Premium Diversion
The agent collects premium payments from the customer but never remits them to the insurance company (or remits only part). The agent may issue a counterfeit policy, binder or receipt so the customer believes coverage is in force. The scheme is usually discovered only when the customer files a claim and the insurer has no record of the policy, or when the policy lapses for non-payment. Agents often sustain the scheme by lapping – using new customers' premiums to pay earlier customers' premiums – or by selecting customers unlikely to file claims. In some cases the agent diverts premiums intended for one insurer to a different, cheaper carrier and pockets the difference.
b) Fictitious Policies
The agent writes policies for people who do not exist, who are deceased, or who never agreed to buy coverage, in order to earn first-year commissions or to meet production quotas and qualify for bonuses, trips or contests. The agent pays the initial premium from the commission advance and then allows the policy to lapse. The insurer loses the commission paid plus administrative costs. Mass fictitious policy creation was the heart of the historic Equity Funding Corporation scandal, in which thousands of fake life policies were created and even reinsured.
c) Fictitious Payees
The agent alters the name of the payee on a claim cheque, dividend, loan or refund so that it is paid to the agent or an accomplice, or submits a change of address so that the customer's cheque is mailed to the agent. Related variations include unauthorised policy loans taken against a customer's cash value and forged surrender requests.
d) Fictitious Death Claims
An agent obtains or forges a death certificate and other documents for a living insured (or a fictitious insured) and files a death claim on a life policy, arranging for the proceeds to be routed to the agent or an accomplice.
e) Underwriting Irregularities
Agents may falsify information on applications so that an otherwise unacceptable risk is approved, allowing them to earn the commission. Typical falsifications include age, medical history, smoking status, occupation, driving record, property condition or prior losses. The agent may also back-date applications or coverage effective dates so that a loss that already occurred is covered.
f) Twisting
The agent induces a policyholder to cancel an existing policy and buy a new one – often from a different company – by misrepresenting the terms or benefits of either policy. The purpose is to earn a new first-year commission. The customer typically loses surrender value and may face new contestability periods or higher premiums because of increased age.
g) Churning
Churning is twisting within the same company, repeated over time. The agent persuades the customer to use the accumulated cash value, dividends or loans of an existing policy to fund a replacement policy, repeatedly, generating fresh commissions each time while depleting the customer's equity. The term equity funding is often used by the FEM in this context: the agent uses the cash value (equity) of a customer's existing policy to buy new policies, frequently with the misleading promise that policy dividends or growth will pay the new premiums so the customer will pay nothing out of pocket.
h) Sliding
The agent includes additional coverage or products (for example, accidental death riders, travel club memberships, towing or motor club coverage) in the sale without the customer's knowledge or informed consent. The customer believes the extra charge is part of the required premium. Sliding is common in high-volume auto insurance agencies.
i) Rebating and Unlawful Inducements
The agent offers the customer part of the commission, gifts or other valuable consideration as an inducement to buy, which is prohibited in most jurisdictions because it discriminates among insureds and can be used to disguise kickbacks.
j) Surety and Performance Bond Schemes
Agents issue surety or performance bonds that are counterfeit, that exceed their binding authority, or that are drawn on companies that do not exist, pocketing the premium. The fraud surfaces only when a contractor defaults and the obligee tries to collect.
k) Insured-Side Premium Fraud (Workers' Compensation)
Employers lower their premiums by: underreporting payroll; misclassifying high-risk employees (e.g., roofers) as low-risk clerical workers; treating employees as independent contractors; forming new shell entities to escape a poor experience modification rating; or lying about safety programmes. Although committed by the insured rather than the agent, this is tested under premium fraud and the examiner should know the payroll-audit approach to detecting it.
4. Red Flags of Agent and Broker Fraud
• High number of lapsed or cancelled policies early in the policy life (first-year lapse ratio well above peers).
• Many policyholders sharing the agent's address, a post office box, or an address of a relative or associate of the agent.
• Policyholders who cannot be reached or who deny knowledge of the policy.
• Premium payments made in cash, by money order, or by cheques drawn on the agent's own account.
• Frequent policy replacements or loans within the agent's book of business.
• Requests for changes of address, beneficiary or payee shortly before a claim, refund or surrender.
• Unusually high commission or bonus earnings compared with persistency.
• Customer complaints about receiving unexpected riders or products, or about coverage they did not purchase.
• Claims occurring suspiciously soon after the effective date, or effective dates that appear back-dated.
• Agent resists insurer contact with customers or insists on handling all correspondence personally.
• Death certificates or supporting claim documents that appear altered or come from unusual sources.
5. Detection and Prevention Controls
• Direct confirmation with policyholders – insurers should mail policies, premium notices and lapse notices directly to insureds, not through the agent, and periodically confirm coverage by telephone or letter.
• Persistency and lapse analysis – track early lapse ratios, replacement ratios and commission chargebacks by agent and compare with peers.
• Commission audits – reconcile commissions paid to premiums actually received; investigate commission advances on policies that quickly lapse.
• Address and bank account analytics – search for duplicate addresses, phone numbers or bank accounts across many policyholders.
• Segregation of duties – agents should not be able to change payee or address information and also receive cheques; changes should be independently verified with the customer.
• Replacement forms and suitability reviews – most regulators require disclosure forms when a policy is replaced; review these for patterns of twisting or churning.
• Premium audits – for workers' compensation, perform payroll audits using tax filings, time records and job descriptions to verify classifications.
• Licensing and background checks on agents, plus monitoring of regulatory complaints and consumer complaint logs.
• Customer education – advising customers to pay by cheque payable only to the insurer, never to the agent personally, and to demand the actual policy document.
6. Investigative Approach for a CFE
When examining a suspected agent fraud, the fraud examiner typically: obtains the agent's complete book of business and commission statements; identifies anomalous patterns (lapses, replacements, shared addresses); contacts a sample of policyholders directly to confirm the existence and terms of their policies and what they actually paid; traces premium funds through the agent's bank accounts to identify diversion or lapping; examines application files for altered or inconsistent information; and compares signatures across documents to detect forgery. Interviews should progress from neutral third parties (customers, office staff) toward the agent, with the agent interviewed last.
7. Exam Tips: Answering Questions on Agent, Broker and Premium Fraud
Tip 1 – Master the vocabulary, because many questions are pure definition. Be able to match each term instantly:
• Premium theft = agent keeps the premium; customer thinks they are covered.
• Fictitious policies = fake policies written for commissions or quotas.
• Fictitious payee = payee name or address altered so the agent gets the cheque.
• Twisting = misrepresentation to induce replacement of a policy (often with another company) for a new commission.
• Churning = repeated replacement within the same company, draining the customer's cash value.
• Equity funding = using an existing policy's cash value to buy new policies, with promises the policy will pay for itself.
• Sliding = adding unwanted coverage without the customer's knowledge.
• Rebating = sharing commission or giving inducements to buy.
Tip 2 – Watch for the twisting versus churning distinction. If the question stresses misrepresentation and switching policies, think twisting. If it stresses repeated replacements and use of the customer's cash value to fund new premiums, think churning or equity funding.
Tip 3 – Identify who the victim is. Questions sometimes ask who bears the loss. Premium theft and twisting harm the policyholder; fictitious policies and commission schemes harm the insurer; workers' compensation premium fraud harms the insurer (and honest competing employers).
Tip 4 – Identify who the perpetrator is. The CFE Exam separates schemes by perpetrator: agent/broker schemes, insurer insider schemes, claimant schemes, and insured/employer premium schemes. Read carefully for whether the actor is the agent, the insurer employee, the claimant or the employer.
Tip 5 – Know the classic red flags. A scenario describing many policyholders at the same address, premiums paid by the agent's own cheques, or a sudden address change before a refund is pointing you toward agent fraud. Choose the answer that reflects the specific scheme those facts describe.
Tip 6 – Know the single best control. When asked how an insurer can best detect or prevent premium theft or fictitious policies, the strongest answer is usually direct communication with the policyholder (sending policies, notices and confirmations directly to the insured, not through the agent) or reconciling commissions to premiums received.
Tip 7 – For workers' compensation premium fraud, think payroll audit. If a question describes an employer classifying roofers as clerical staff or hiding payroll, the scheme is premium fraud and the detection method is a premium or payroll audit comparing payroll records with tax filings and job duties.
Tip 8 – Read for the word lapse. High early lapse rates are the single most frequently tested red flag of fictitious policy and commission schemes. Likewise, a claim filed shortly after the effective date suggests back-dating or an application misrepresentation.
Tip 9 – Eliminate distractors by scheme family. If an answer option describes a claimant inflating a loss, staging an accident or a provider billing for services not rendered, it belongs to claimant or provider fraud, not agent/broker fraud. Eliminate it when the question stem is about agents or premiums.
Tip 10 – Remember the historic case. Equity Funding Corporation of America (1970s) is the textbook example of fictitious policies created on a massive scale and sold to reinsurers. If a question references a company creating thousands of bogus life policies to inflate revenue and reinsure them, that is the reference point.
8. Quick Self-Test
Q1. An agent persuades a client to surrender a whole life policy and use its cash value to purchase a new policy, assuring the client that dividends will cover all future premiums. Which scheme is this? – Equity funding / churning.
Q2. A customer discovers after a house fire that her homeowner policy was never issued, although she paid the agent in cash and received a receipt. Which scheme? – Premium theft (premium diversion).
Q3. An auto insurance agent adds a motor club membership to every policy sold without telling customers, telling them the total is the required premium. Which scheme? – Sliding.
Q4. An agent's book of business shows a 60 percent first-year lapse rate and dozens of insureds sharing one P.O. box. What should the examiner suspect? – Fictitious policies written to earn commissions or meet quotas.
Q5. The most effective control to prevent an agent from concealing non-remitted premiums is: – Mailing policies, premium and lapse notices directly to the insured rather than through the agent.
9. Summary
Agent, broker and premium fraud exploits the intermediary's control over money and paperwork. The schemes fall into stealing premiums, inventing policies or payees, manipulating the sales process for commissions (twisting, churning, sliding, rebating), falsifying underwriting information, and – on the insured side – misrepresenting risk to lower premiums. For the CFE Exam, focus on crisp definitions, the typical red flags (early lapses, shared addresses, agent-paid premiums, pre-claim address changes) and the key controls (direct insured contact, commission reconciliation, replacement review and premium audits). Answer scenario questions by first identifying the perpetrator, then the victim, then the precise scheme name.
CFE - Agent, Broker and Premium Fraud Example Questions
Test your knowledge of Agent, Broker and Premium Fraud
Question 1
Which of the following BEST describes the usual aim of an insurance agent who submits policy applications in the names of fictitious or nonexistent insureds?
Question 2
In a premium diversion scheme, an insurance agent changes the beneficiary of record on a client's policy to himself or an accomplice, then submits a claim to collect the proceeds.
Question 3
A fraud examiner receives complaints from several customers of one insurance agent. Each says the policy was cancelled for nonpayment, yet each insists the premium was paid to the agent in cash, and some hold handwritten receipts. The insurer's records show no premiums were received on these policies. Which procedure would BEST test the examiner's fraud theory?